University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
Summer 2014

Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the 'Crowd'
Joan M. Heminway

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Apr 20 13:33:37 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd, 38 VT. L. REV. 827 (2014).
ALWD 7th ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd, 38 Vt. L. Rev. 827 (2014).
APA 7th ed.
Heminway, J. (2014). Investor and market protection in the crowdfunding era:
disclosing to and for the crowd. Vermont Law Review, 38(4), 827-848.
Chicago 17th ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, "Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd," Vermont Law Review 38, no. 4 (Summer 2014): 827-848
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, "Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd" (2014) 38:4 Vt L Rev 827.
AGLC 4th ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, 'Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd' (2014) 38(4) Vermont Law Review 827
MLA 9th ed.
Heminway, Joan MacLeod. "Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd." Vermont Law Review, vol. 38, no. 4, Summer 2014,
pp. 827-848. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, 'Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the Crowd' (2014) 38 Vt L Rev 827
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

INVESTOR AND MARKET PROTECTION IN THE
CROWDFUNDING ERA: DISCLOSING TO AND FOR THE
"CROWD"
Joan MacLeod Heminway*
INTRODUCTION

Policymakers use mandatory disclosure as a means of achieving
important regulatory objectives. Disclosure informs its audience. The
audience can then use the disclosed information to make decisions. If
disclosure requirements are standardized across the audience's decisionmaking options, then the calculus of decision makers can include
comparative elements.
Disclosure can be a means of protecting a desired audience from what
it does not know; especially where part of that desired audience has unequal
access to the desired information because of, for example, a lack of access
to information sources or a lack of resources necessary to access adequate
information. In this way, disclosure enables better decision making because
it cures or limits informational asymmetries. Whether better decisions
actually are made depends on a number of factors, including the objectives
of the decision makers and their respective abilities to comprehend and
process the meaning of the disclosed information in the context of those
objectives.
Information asymmetries among market participants can have negative
effects on the markets in which information is used. Disclosure
requirements that respond to information asymmetries may mitigate those
market effects. For example, disclosure can correct information
asymmetries and give market participants confidence that the playing field
in the market is even, or at least fair.
And where disclosure is required to serve these purposes, regulators
may initiate an enforcement action for a failure to meet disclosure
obligations. For disclosure requirements to be meaningful, those who fail to
disclose required information must be identified and penalized. Claims
* W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
New York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982. This Article has
benefitted from comments given to the author by participants in the 2013 Annual Meeting of the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools, the 2013-14 Transactional Law Workshop organized by
Gordon Smith and Afra Afsharipour, a faculty forum at Marquette University Law School, and a
scholarship forum sponsored by The University of Tennessee Corporate Governance Center, as well as
observations made by those present at the Vermont Law School symposium for which this Article was
researched and written: The Disclosure Debates: The Regulatory Power of an Informed Public. Special
thanks are owed to Michael Guttentag, Michelle Hamer, Matt Jennejohn, and Jennifer Taub for their
unique encouragement, support, and contributions.
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relating to disclosure lapses in securities markets, for example, may sound
in securities fraud, and that fraud may be based on misstatements of
important information or omissions to state important information that
make extant disclosed information misleading. However, a misstatement of
required information that does not constitute securities fraud also may
occur, and this type of misstatement also may be actionable. Liability for
fraud based on misstatements of, or omissions to state, important
information and non-fraud liability for misstatements of important
information support and encourage accurate and complete required and
desired disclosures of important information.
Consistent with these general observations about disclosure policy,
mandatory disclosure has been and continues to be a key regulatory tool in
U.S. securities regulation.' Along with the prevention of fraud and other
misleading conduct and the substantive regulation of market participants,
disclosure mandates under securities laws and rules-including those in and
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (1933 Act), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (1934 Act)--serve to protect investors,
maintain the integrity of securities markets, and encourage capital
formation.2 These are the core policy objectives of securities regulation.
Well-known economic theory explains the utility of mandatory
disclosure as an important instrument in achieving these policy goals. In
particular, the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) describes a
connection between information and market pricing.3 Under the semistrong version of the ECMH, we assume that the trading price of securities
reflects all publicly available information.

1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023, 1023 (2000) ("Mandatory disclosure is a-if not the--defining characteristic of U.S.
securities regulation." (emphasis in original) (citing Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v.
Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1998))).
2. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1319, 1325 n.17 (1998) ("The prohibitions on fraud, as many other securities acts'
regulations, are based on two policies: protecting investors, to maintain their confidence in the markets'
integrity, and the encouragement of capital formation."); Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and
State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 545
(2003) ("Although the primary goal of securities regulation is frequently articulated as investor
protection, this understanding is too simplistic. Capital formation is at the heart of the capitalist
system.").
3. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 413-16 (1970) (reviewing foundational works on efficient capital markets).
4. See id. at 404,415 (defining and briefly describing this form of the ECMH).
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The touchstone of disclosure policy in securities regulation is the
"reasonable investor."5 It is this investor that securities disclosure
regulation strives to protect through materiality qualifiers used in the
mandatory disclosure provisions in U.S. federal securities laws and rules.
Although the attributes of the reasonable investor are far from clear,
securities law generally assumes that the reasonable investor is informed
and acts rationally to maximize economic value, both when engaging in
securities trading transactions and when exercising voting rights associated
with securities ownership.6
This Article focuses on disclosure regulation in a specific context:
securities crowdfunding (also known as crowdfund investing or investment
crowdfunding). The intended primary audience for disclosures made in the
crowdfund investing setting is the "crowd," an ill-defined group of potential
and actual investors in securities offered and sold through crowdfunding.
Securities crowdfunding, for purposes of this Article, refers to an offering
of securities made over the Internet to a broad-based, unstructured group of
investors who are not qualified by geography, financial wherewithal, access
to information, investment experience or acumen, or any other criterion.7
Individual members of the crowd may or may not have the attributes of the
reasonable investor-the type of investor protected by U.S. federal
securities laws and rules. The nature of the crowd itself, however, may play
a role in the need for disclosure to protect investors, maintain market
integrity, and encourage capital formation.
It is this aspect of disclosure regulation-disclosure over the Internet to
a general, amorphous crowd-on which this Article focuses attention.
Scholarly literature outlines two principal ways in which the behavioral
5. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them,
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 343-49 (2008) (describing the concept and role of the reasonable
investor in Securities fraud actions under Section 10(b) of and Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act).
6. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the
Reasonable Investor A Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 296-309 (2009) (discussing
legal conceptions of the reasonable investor).
7. This description of securities crowdfunding represents my definition of that concept for
purposes of this Article and is one among many. See, e.g., Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption?
Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L.
63, 74-78 (2011) (describing patronage-plus and pure investment crowdfunding, two asserted variants
of securities crowdfunding); see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2013) (describing crowdfunding and differentiating securities crowdfunding).
Intemet-based private placement transactions using Rule 506(c) of Regulation D under the 1933 Act, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.506(c) (2013), and public offerings conducted in compliance with Regulation A under the
1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263, or state-based exemptions complying with Rule 147 under the
1933 Act, id. § 230.147, for example, are not included in this definition. Having said that, disclosure to
these more limited "crowds" may involve some of the same considerations involved in disclosure to a
more dispersed, disaggregated, unbounded crowd.
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psychology of crowds interacts with securities markets. Crowds can be
"mad"-irrational, foolish, and even stupid.8 On the other hand, crowds can
be "wise"-rational, sensible, and intelligent.9 These observations have
resulted in theoretical analyses of the operation of each type of crowd, mad
and wise. This Article preliminarily addresses two important matters
emanating from this literature: (1) the version of the crowd that is likely to
operate in the securities-crowdfunding context; and (2) the impact of that
likelihood on the way we look at disclosure regulation in the crowdfunding
context. At the time this Article went to press, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was seeking comments on proposed rulesincluding mandatory disclosure rules-as required by Congress under the
Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical NonDisclosure Act (CROWDFUND Act), signed into law in April 2012 as Title
III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).' 0 Accordingly,
it is important (albeit perhaps a bit late), on the eve of the adoption and
implementation of mandatory disclosure rules under the CROWDFUND
Act, to question the nature of the crowdfunding crowd and assess the type
of mandatory disclosure that may best address its needs (as well as the more
general regulatory objectives of investor protection, market integrity
maintenance, and capital formation encouragement) in the context of
federal securities regulation.
To be sure, an understanding of the nature of the crowd is significant,
if not foundational, in an assessment of the potential efficacy of the SEC's
proposed disclosure rules. The overall inquiry into the audience for
disclosure is, and is likely to remain, significant in regulatory regimes like
securities regulation that depend on mandatory disclosure to do heavy
lifting. Yet the precise nature of investor crowds-supported by empirical
research-is not often expressly considered in engaging mandatory
disclosure as a regulatory tool or modifying it over time as investor profiles
change. In some cases (and crowdfunding represents one of these cases),
investment markets are relatively untested, making a meaningful empirical
assessment of the investor crowd impossible. As a result, theory must guide
the relevant analysis of the investor crowd at the present time.

8. See generally CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY

MADNESS OF CROWDS (Three Rivers Press 1980) (1841)
examples of crowd madness).
9.

POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE

(collecting and summarizing historical

See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv (2005) (explaining that

individual human beings are not perfectly designed decision makers, but when imperfect judgments are
aggregated in the right way, collective intelligence is often excellent).
10. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315-23 (2012).
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To assess disclosure to and for the crowd, this Article proceeds in three
principal Parts before concluding. First, the Article briefly describes
securities crowdfunding and the related disclosure and regulatory
environments. Next, the Article outlines basic principles from the two
principal branches of scholarly literature on the nature of investment
crowds. Finally, the Article assesses the possible implications of that body
of literature for the regulation of disclosure in the securities-crowdfunding
setting.
I. THE "CROWD" IN SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunded securities offerings are a relatively recent, high-growth
phenomenon borne, at least in part, from frustration with traditional capitalraising methods and processes. In less than ten years, the concept of
crowdfunding was essentially born (or at least labeled) and extended from
financial support offered principally as gifts or product or service prepayments to investments made with an expectation of profits." The advent
and growth of crowdfunding and securities crowdfunding was natural and
unplanned.12 It represents a logical (even if not, in some cases, initially
legal) combination of existing and evolving social media memes with
traditional elements of corporate finance. The democratization of capitalopening securities offerings to investors traditionally shut out of the private
investment market-was a strong motivation for proponents of securities
crowdfunding.13 As one pair of observers noted, "our current ills in capital
formation come from that fact that we traditionally don't access capital
from an open marketplace."l 4
To that point, the overall "crowd" in securities crowdfinding is, from
all appearances, likely to be heterogeneous.' 5 Although securities
I1. See Burkett, supra note 7, at 71 ("There are now many crowdfunding websitcs in existence,
most of which follow the patronage model. However, some investment crowdfunding sites are coming
into the market." (footnote omitted)).
12. See KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: How To RAISE
VENTURE CAPITAL USING SOCIAL MEDIA 47-53 (2013) (describing the rise and continued growth of
crowdfunding and securities crowdfunding).
13. This is an objective of the CROWDFUND Act. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light.
Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 4445 (2013) (noting that the CROWDFUND Act "aims to democratize the market for speculative business
investments by allowing investors of modest means to make investments that had previously been
offered solely to wealthy, so-called 'accredited' investors.").
14. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 70; see also SHERWOOD NEISS ET AL., CROWDFUND
INVESTING FOR DUMMIES 30-40 (2013) (describing circumstances that led to the enactment of the

CROWDFUND Act).
15. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 181 ("Crowdfunding ....
power when the collective diversity is the greatest.").

draws its maximum
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crowdfunding has not yet lawfully occurred in the United States outside the
public offering market (making an empirical study in the United States
premature), a number of preliminary observations can be made about the
group of funders in crowdfunded offerings to date. Securitiescrowdfunding's crowd has no single investment objective or group of
investment objectives.' 6 It has the potential to be geographically dispersed,
even if that potential is not fully realized in certain offerings. 7 It also has
the potential to correct historical gender inequities in business finance.'8 It
is likely to include representatives of various social groups and economic
classes.' 9 Its members are in all likelihood politically diverse. 20 As a result,
the potential and actual audience is not easily classified from many
commonly studied demographic perspectives.
Moreover, the securities-crowdfunding "crowd" is an Internet-based
phenomenon. 2' Members of this crowd are connected and communicate
through the Internet-forming new relationships and sustaining and
terminating existing ones. The collective nature of this group of potential
and actual investors-its very identity as a group-is defined by the
Internet connection of the group members to an issuer of securities and, in
16. See Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS.
VENTURING 1, 3 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2088298 ("[T]he actual goals of funders
are extremely heterogeneous. Individuals may invest in a ... project in order to support a cause that is
viewed as important, to personally support the project founders, as a political statement, as a joke, or for
any one of a number of other reasons." (footnotes omitted)).
17. See id. at 14 ("[C]rowdfunding potentially changes the nature of geography and association
in new ventures. At least in part, crowdfunding reduces the importance of traditional geographic
constraints, even as it potentially imposes new ones."); see also id. at 9-11 (describing geographic
findings and offering observations on geography based on other scholars' work.); Ajay Agrawal et al.,
The Geography of Crowdfunding 17 (NET Institute, Working Paper No. 10-08, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1692661.
[O]ur result suggests that online mechanisms can reduce economic frictions
associated with investing in early-stage projects over long distances. Only the
spatial correlation of pre-existing social networks is not resolved, and the online
mechanisms do not yet eliminate frictions related to information that is easily
conveyed through a social network.
Id.
18. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 65-66.
19. See NEISS ET AL., supra note 14, at 39 (noting that, as a result of the CROWDFUND Act,
"companies that use crowdfund investing to raise capital are legally able to solicit people of all net
worths and incomes levels to purchase their shares.").
20. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 181 ("Crowdfunding is the one mechanism for
which people of all political parties seem to come together on .... Crowdfunding is without a political
party.").
21. See id. at 3-10 (describing the rise of the crowdfunding crowd as an Internet-driven and
supported process); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) ("The internet is a strikingly useful tool for organizing or creating crowds.").
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some cases, to each other. "Social technologies" integrate the individuals
into a coherent, identifiable group.22
Members of this Internet-based crowd may have had no physical
contact with the issuer or each other apart from Internet solicitations and
communications. But crowd members are connected. One commentator
described the overall nature of crowdfunding's Internet crowd (by reference
to its relationship to the principals of the business or project seeking
funding) as:
[P]eople who are part of your extended network, acquaintances,
those connected to your acquaintances by multiple degrees of
separation. They're strangers who may already be fans either of
your work or of the genre you're working in. They're people who
share your passion whom you've never met before, but you're
able to pull them in by making connections as well as by getting
mentioned in the media outlets they pay attention to.23
Indeed, online social networks can be modeled and evidence patterns of
communication in affinity groups that reflect these connections.2 4
An affinity group "can be loosely defined as a group of people with
similar interests or motivations."25 As part of the larger crowd, an affinity
group ensures that the wider crowd receives and uses important
information. 26 In other words, among other things, the affinity group sifts
through and sorts available information, and selectively passes it on to
members of the wider crowd.27
Affinity groups can be thought of as amplifiers, so tomorrow's
crowdsourcing mechanisms can help amplify accuracy and truth
by offering mechanisms to assess credibility, timeliness, and
possession of what's called local information (information that is
held by only a few), and they can facilitate these assessments in

22. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 9 (defining "social technologies" and
differentiating them from "physical technologies").
23. DON STEINBERG, THE KICKSTARTER HANDBOOK: REAL-LIFE CROWDFUNDING SUCCESS
STORIES 74 (2012); see also LAwTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 55 (offering data on the

development of crowdfunding contributions from circles of friends). This description invokes the
"small-world phenomenon" and, more broadly, scholarship involving the structure of human networks
and the behavior of people in them. See, e.g., DUNCAN J. WATTS, SMALL WORLDS: THE DYNAMICS OF
NETWORKS BETWEEN ORDER AND RANDOMNESS (1998).
24. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 10-14.

25. Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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near or actual real time across an arbitrary set of participants for a
given event or outcome.28
This coordinating function makes affinity groups an important part of the
power of the crowd.
As this description of the affinity groups embedded in crowds
indicates, the securities-crowdfunding "crowd" is not likely to be a single,
cohesive investor group. Neither individual crowdfunded offerings of
securities nor crowdfunded securities offerings taken as a whole will
necessarily (or even likely) attract a singular affinity group. Rather, if it
tracks participation in the crowdfunding audience generally, membership in
the securities-crowdfunding audience is likely to ebb and flow depending
on the timing and nature of the offering, the nature of the issuer, and other
factors. 2 9 For instance, data show that most funding for Kickstarter
projects-89% in one documented case-comes from backers who are
driven to an offering from outside the Kickstarter site, a sign that backers in
the Kickstarter crowd are not always repeat players.30
Although membership in crowdfunding's "crowd" may be multifaceted
and dynamic, a crowd network is cognizable as an identifiable decisionmaking group. One commentator broadly described the development of a
crowd as "[t]he disappearance of conscious personality and the turning of
feelings and thoughts in a definite direction." 3' The formation of a crowd
requires neither a large number of participants nor specific intent.
Thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at certain
moments, and under the influence of certain violent emotionssuch, for example, as a great national event-the characteristics
of a psychological crowd. It will be sufficient in that case that a
mere chance should bring them together for their acts to at once
assume the characteristics peculiar to the acts of a crowd. At
certain moments half a dozen men might constitute a
psychological crowd, which may not happen in the case of
hundreds of men gathered together by accident. On the other
hand, an entire nation, though there may be no visible

28. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original).
29. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 10-11 (characterizing a nctworked crowd as
having a dynamic structure); cf SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at xvii (noting that crowds, "like the stock
market, exist mainly as an cvcr-changing collection of numbers and dollars").
30. See STEINBERG, supra note 23, at 76.
31.

2001) (1896).

GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 13 (Batoche Books
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agglomeration, may become a crowd under the action of certain
influences. 32
Others similarly define the concept of a crowd broadly. Crowds share "the
ability to act collectively to make decisions and solve problems-even if
the people in the groups aren't always aware that's what they're doing." 34
The law regulates securities offerings made to the crowd in a manner
different from that used to regulate crowdfunding generally. For example,
in the United States, offers and sales of securities must be registered unless
an exemption from registration is applicable. 35 Registration is a relatively
lengthy, costly process focusing on detail-oriented mandatory disclosure
rules. From a regulatory perspective, while securities crowdfunding can
be accomplished in a traditional offering registered under the 1933 Act,37
the securities-crowdfunding movement was built on the premise that the
offerings should be exempt from the 1933 Act's registration requirements.
Yet, prior to the adoption of the JOBS Act in the spring of 2012, the most
promising registration exemptions, those in Regulation D under the 1933
Act, prohibited general solicitation and advertising, making them
unavailable for open Internet securities offerings. 39 A number of early and
32. Id. at 13-14.
33. See SUROWIECKI, supranote 9, at xvi-xvii (broadly crowds to include those with no formal
organization).
34. Id. at xvii.
35. 15 U.S.C. §77e (2012).
36. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 908-10 (2011) (summarizing the
costs of registration under the 1933 Act and citing to relevant authority).
37. Several crowdfundcd offerings have pursued registration under the 1933 Act. See, e.g.,
Fantex, Inc., Amendment No. I to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-I/A) (Dec. 27, 2013),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/Archivcs/edgar/data/1 573683/000104746913011415/a2217824zsI a.htm (Series Vernon Davis); Fantex, Inc., Amendment No. I to Form S-I Registration Statement
(Form S-I/A) (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/cdgar/data/1573683/
000104746913010117/a2217205zs-Ia.htm; Audience Prod., Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Form S-I
Registration Statement (Form S-I/A) (Apr. 21, 2010), availableat http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
datall474227/000147422710000015/dsla.htm. The Audience Productions offering was, in the end,
unsuccessful. See Audience Prod., Inc., Post-Effective Amendment.No. 6 to Form S-1 Registration
Statement (Form S-I/A) (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1474227/
000 147422711000018/dposam.htm.
38. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 81 (2012); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?Social Networks and
the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2012); see also Letter from Jenny Kassan, Co-Director,
Sustainable Econs. Law Ctr., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (July 1, 2010),
availableat https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/201 0/petn4-605.pdf.
39. Even after full implementation of the JOBS Act, Regulation D does not exempt securities
crowdfunding from 1933 Act registration. Because the securities offered in transactions exempt from
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ongoing crowdfunded offerings of investment interests are, or appear to be,
unregistered offerings conducted in violation of the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act (or similar state registration requirements).4 0
Securities-crowdfunding regulation also includes and must contemplate
the regulation of primary and secondary trading markets, matters governed
in and under the 1934 Act. For example, the websites through which
securities are crowdfunded serve in a role that makes them transactional
intermediaries in the manner of securities brokers or even securities
exchanges, both of which are regulated under the 1934 Act. 4 1 Under the
CROWDFUND Act, these websites-which are mandatory components of
the federal registration exemption-must be registered brokers or registered
funding portals, a new type of securities trading intermediary created in the
CROWDFUND Act.42 In addition, the possibility that crowdfunded
securities will be resold raises questions not only about the regulation of
market intermediaries involved in those resale transactions, but also about
the public availability of the facts necessary to informed market
participation. If made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
misstatements of material fact or omissions to state material fact that make
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, misleading may be actionable as securities fraud under Rule lOb-5, a
rule adopted by the SEC under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.43
II. BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CROWD

Two distinct observations from behavioral psychology literature offer
two radically different touchstones for assessing the need for, and efficacy
of, disclosure to and for crowdfunding investors. Each narrative about
crowd behavior is compellingly descriptive. Each has insights relevant to
securities crowdfunding.

registration under Rule 506 of Regulation D that take advantage of the new open solicitation aspects of
that rule mandated in the JOBS Act may only be sold to a limited "crowd" (specifically, accredited
investors), I do not consider Rule 506 offerings conducted over the Internet to be crowdfunding.
40. See, e.g., Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913
(Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.see.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-8984.pdf (holding that an
online lending platform violated the Securities Act); see also Hellum v. Breyer, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803,
806, 815-16 (2011) (describing related proceeding based on a California securities law violation).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78k, 78o, 78s (2012) (providing for the registration of brokers and
national securities exchanges).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(a)(1) (codifying the CROWDFUND Act requirement that a registered
broker or funding portal be involved in securities crowdfunding in order for the registration exemption
to apply). Funding portals are defined in section 3(a)(80) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob.5 (2014).
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One thread in this literature looks at the phenomenon of crowds in
economic bubbles (e.g., tulipmania, a/k/a tulipomania)." These works focus
principally on crowds that encourage concerted irrational (or at least
suboptimal) economic behavior-lemming-like, blind, single-minded
adherence to a course of action that individual rational actors in the crowd
would not likely pursue if they engaged in their own, independent costbenefit analysis.45 This branch of scholarly writings, believed by some to
overstate factual reality, exemplifies the madness of the crowd.
The other strain in the literature offers insights on crowds as a source
of collective intelligence. In this scholarship, the crowd is essentially seen
as a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. In effect, this branch of
behavioral scholarship documents and explains why two (or more) heads
are better than one-the wisdom of the crowd.
These two descriptive accounts of crowds have the potential to offer
insights important to the regulation of crowdfunding. To that end, this Part
explains both theoretical positions in greater detail and offers, in each case,
information that is relevant to the application of the theories from these two
branches of scholarly literature to crowdfunding. While incomplete, the
account offered in this Part is intended to provide a foundation for a
preliminary assessment and further analysis and research.
A. The Madness of the Crowd
Charles Mackay is generally acknowledged to be the first to document
the madness of crowds.46 Through various historical illustrations, Mackay
asserts that groups of people can be collectively "mad"-jointly misguided,
even illogical.

44. See generally MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA: THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST COVETED
FLOWER & THE EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED (1999) (recounting the history of the "tulip

bubble" during which time tulips were selling for extraordinary sums of money).
45. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005) (differentiating

irrational exuberance from "the kind of investor euphoria or madness described by some storytellers");
Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay ofSecurities Regulation, 38
CONN. L. REV. 393, 398 (2006) (discussing behavioral biases that cause "herding" and irrational
investment strategies).
46. See generally TIM PHILLIPS, CHARLES MACKAY'S EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS

AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (2009) ("Mackay's catalogue of our own craziness, spanning about a
millennium, was the first book to demonstrate what scientists now know: when we act in groups we're
often not very smart."); NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN

THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, at 60 (2010) ("Mackay's book may have been the first attempt to draw
lessons from the history of economic crises.").
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In reading the history of nations, we find that, like individuals,
they have their whims and their peculiarities; their seasons of
excitement and recklessness, when they care not what they do.
We find that whole communities suddenly fix their minds upon
one object, and go mad in its pursuit; that millions of people
become simultaneously impressed with one delusion, and run
after it, till their attention is caught by some new folly more
captivating than the first.47
Mackay is widely cited for these assertions,4 8 but he is not alone in this
view of the crowd. Scholars and other commentators regularly note
consistent contributions from the work of Gustave Le Bon, 4 9 as well as
quotes from a host of others, to knowledge and narratives about crowd
madness.
Among the historical events that Mackay uses to demonstrate these
principles are the Mississippi Scheme, the South-Sea Bubble, and
Tulipomania 5 0-all now well-known examples of what economists refer to
as herding behaviors (including those founded in information cascades or
direct-benefit effects).51 Herding behaviors may result from information
cascades-sequential decision making in which later decision makers make
choices based on inferences made from the choices of earlier decision
makers. 52 Herding also may reflect direct-benefit effects (also known as
network effects): explicit benefits gained when a decision maker aligns his
or her actions with those of others.s3

47. MACKAY, supra note 8, at xvii.
48. In his popular book on investing, Burton Malkiel references Mackay's work and entitles
the chapter of the book in which he makes that reference "The Madness of Crowds." See BURTON G.
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL

INVESTING 35-36 (9th ed. 2007) (summarizing "tulip-bulb craze" in Holland).
49. See LE BON, supra note 31 (describing characteristics of crowds).
50. MACKAY, supra note 8, at 1-101.
51. See DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING

ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 485 (2010) (outlining and differentiating between information
cascades and direct-benefit effects in group decision making); PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST
BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 5-6 (2000) (describing herding); SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 45, at 157-60 (describing herding behaviors and information
cascades); SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at 49-58 (describing and providing examples of herding and
information cascades). Mackay himself noted herding tendencies and labeled them as such. MACKAY,
supra note 8, at xviii ("Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in
herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.").
52. See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 51, at 483-84 (describing and illustrating
information cascades); SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 45, at 159-60 (describing
information cascades and relating them to stock market bubbles).
53. See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note SI, at 485, 509 (describing direct-benefit effects).
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Mackay's work focuses most closely on herding effects caused by
information cascades. Although herding of this kind may not be irrational
behavior in the eyes of economists (because the actions of an individual in
following the crowd may represent a logical choice),54 Mackay's portrayal
of group behavior in these instances contests the notion that crowd
decisions are rational and the belief that markets are rational institutions.5
Accordingly, it can be seen as an early work in-or at least foundational
to-behavioral economics.
Although Mackay's work has been criticized in various circles,s" his
basic observations about group psychology and behavior have- been tested
and, in general, validated by others.s For example, widely cited research
indicates that the crowd may act in accordance with the behavior or
judgments of a group or an authority figure, rather than based on a detailed
cost-benefit analysis, oftentimes fueling overconfidence. 58 "People fall in
line because they believe they're learning something important from the
example of others."59
In fact, when people act in accordance with information cascades, they
believe that they are taking the overall optimal course of action, based on
their individualized assessment of the likely risks and rewards.
[P]eople are rationally choosing not to, as they see it, waste their
time and effort in exercising their judgment about the market,
and thus choosing not to exert any independent impact on the
market. Ultimately, all such information cascade theories are

54. See, e.g., GARBER, supra note 51, at 5 ("[H]erding is not an irrational act."); SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 45, at 159 ("Even completely rational people can participate in
herd behavior when they take into account the judgments of others, and even if they know that everyone
else is behaving in a herdlike manner.").
55. See GARBER, supra note 51, at 127 (noting that Mackay, among others, portrays the tulip
speculation of the 17th century as "a mania, selecting and organizing the evidence to emphasize the
irrationality of the market outcome").
56. See, e.g., RoUBINI & MIHM, supra note 46, at 60 (describing Mackay as an "[a]mateur( ]"
and his book as "chock-full of inaccuracies").
57. Numerous subsequent works in a variety of disciplines cite to Mackay's historical accounts
and observations. See, e.g., GARBER, supra note 51, at 127-29; MALKIEL, supra note 48, at 35-36;
Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to BehavioralFinance, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 83, 91-92
(2003). A current work in process cites to Mackay's work in the context of crowdfunding. David
Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: ExtraordinaryPopularDelusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding
Constraints and Bircoin Bubbles 3-4 (Aug. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Social
Science Research Network), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2313396.
58. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 45, at 158-59 (describing experiments

that show effect of an authority figure on group decision making).
59. SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at 54.
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theories of the failure of information about true fundamental
value to be disseminatedand evaluated.60

Thus, information cascades illustrate the potential for market valuations of
securities that may not reflect all publicly available information-a
negation of the ECMH. "[O]nce each individual stops relying on his own
knowledge, the cascade stops becoming informative." 6 1
Crowd behaviors also may be evidence of a phenomenon labeled
"price-to-price feedback." 62 This phenomenon results from people buying
securities in response to increases in stock prices and selling securities in
response to decreases in stock prices. This investor behavior "has the
potential to feed back into more price changes in the same direction,"
constituting "price-to-price feedback."" Like information cascades, priceto-price feedback may contribute to herding behaviors and market
bubbles. 6 5 The ECMH does not explain or predict price-to-price feedback.
B. The Wisdom of the Crowd

James Surowiecki tells a different story of the crowd than that told by
Mackay. Using illustrations from general life experiences (in much the
same way that Mackay uses market bubbles and other events), Surowiecki
builds the case for the intelligence of groups-collective intelligence
superior to that of any individual in the group. He does not ignore Mackay's
work in the process of formulating his theory of crowd behavior. Rather, he
explains it in the overall context of his alternative theory of crowds and
66
decision- making.
60. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 45, at 160 (emphasis in original); see also
SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at 54 ("The fundamental problem with an information cascade is that after a
certain point it becomes rational for people to stop paying attention to their own knowledge-their
private information-and to start looking instead at the actions of others and imitate them.").
61. SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at 54.
62. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM, at 134 (2009).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory, supra note 57, at 91-96.
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at xix. Specifically, in his introduction, Surowiecki offers:
Mackay was right about the extremes of collective. behavior: there arc
times ... when aggregating individual decisions produces a collective decision
that is utterly irrational. The stories of these kinds of mistakes are negative proofs
of this book's argument, underscoring the importance to good decision making of
diversity and independence by demonstrating what happens when they're
missing.
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Surowiecki identifies three attributes of crowds that give them the
ability to be wise. These three characteristics are diversity, independence,
and decentralization.67 Each attribute requires individual explication, but
the three do overlap and interrelate.
1. Diversity
When Surowiecki avers that diverse crowds have the capacity to be
wise, he is talking about what he refers to as "conceptual and cognitive"
diversity.6 8 He describes this form of diversity as a difference among those
who are generating ideas, "so you end up with meaningful differences
among those ideas rather than minor variations on the same concept.",6 He
asserts that this type of diversity is important for both identifying possible
alternatives and deciding among them. 7 0 According to Surowiecki, "The
positive case for diversity . . . is that it expands a group's set of possible
solutions and allows the group to conceptualize problems in novel ways."
Surowiecki also notes that a heterogeneous group makes it less likely
that groupthink (a cognitive phenomenon identified and labeled in an
influential work by social psychologist Irving Janis) 72 will be operative.
Groupthink is characterized by "extreme consensus-seeking."7 3 Group
diversity both enriches the number of perspectives brought to the decisionmaking process and makes it easier for group members to dissent and
otherwise express their views in that process. 74 As a result, diversity may
prevent or counteract the development of the consensus-seeking behavior
that characterizes groupthink.

Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at xviii, 23-83.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 36.

72. See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-

POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES, at 9 (1972) (coining "term 'groupthink' as a quick and easy way to
refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative
courses of action"); see also, e.g., Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-Five Years of
Groupthink Theory and Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 105-07 (1998) (summarizing development of groupthink
theory).
73. Turner & Pratkanis, supra note 72, at 106.
74. SUROWIECKI, supra note 9, at 36-39.
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2. Independence
Surowiecki next discusses independence as a prerequisite to crowd
intelligence. In this context, independence connotes "relative freedom from
the influence of others."7 In particular, it is important that members of the
group not influence each other's autonomous idea generation and decision
making. "[T]he more influence a group's members exert on each other, and
the more personal contact they have with each other, the less likely it is that
the group's decisions will be wise ones."7 This type of independence
stands in contrast to the operation of, for example, the information cascades
that characterize the madness of crowds. Accordingly, "[o]ne key to
successful group decisions is getting people to pay much less attention to
what everyone else is saying."n
Independence serves two important functions in supporting intelligent
group decision making: (1) it avoids correlated judgment errors; and (2) it
better ensures that novel information is available to the group, supplying a
connection with diversity.78 Surowiecki observes that "[o]ne of the quickest
ways to make people's judgments systematically biased is to make them
dependent on each other for information." 79 He further notes that "[t]he
smartest groups ... are made up of people with diverse perspectives who
are able to stay independent of each other."8 0 Individual autonomy within
the crowd therefore helps prevent bias and the errors attendant to biased
decisions and facilitates the flow of new information into the crowd's
decision making.
3. Decentralization
Decentralization is the third (and perhaps the most tenuous) attribute
that affords crowds the ability to be wise. Surowiecki defines a
decentralized organization as a system in which "power does not fully
reside in one central location, and many of the important decisions are
made by individuals based on their own local and specific knowledge rather
than by an omniscient or farseeing planner."8' He further notes that
decentralization "fosters, and in turn is fed by, specialization" and is central
to "tacit knowledge"-"knowledge that can't be easily summarized or
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70-71.
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conveyed to others, because it is specific to a particular place or job or
experience, but it is nonetheless tremendously valuable." This definition is
a broad one that is difficult to grasp and may be challenging to apply in
context.
Decentralization for these purposes is connected to diversity and
independence. Surowiecki uses the crowdsourcing of Linux as an example
of a system in which decentralization encourages diversity.
Decentralization effectively enables independence while still allowing for
coordinated deliberation and decision making.84
The idea of the wisdom of crowds . . . takes decentralization as a

given and a good, since it implies that if you set a crowd of selfinterested, independent people to work in a decentralized way on
the same problem, instead of trying to direct their efforts from the
top down, their collective solution is likely to be better than any
other solution you could come up with.85
Because it may enable or foster both diversity and independence,
decentralization serves an important supportive role in crowd wisdom.
Decentralization also has weaknesses. Valuable information may have
difficulty reaching all of those who need it.86 Decentralization can easily
dissolve into disorganization without some way of aggregating the disparate
information and decisions of the group members. 7 The trick in making
decentralization effectual for crowd intelligence is balancing its strengths
and weaknesses. Yet, creating this optimal level of aggregation in a
decentralized crowd may be easier said than done.89
III. REGULATION DISCLOSURE IN THE CROWDFUNDING CONTEXT

In a different context (that of flash mobs and First Amendment
jurisprudence on incitement), one commentator observed that
82. Id. at 71.
83. Id. at 73.
84. Id. at71.
85. Id. at 70.
86. Id. at 71.
87. Id. at 76.
88. See, e.g., id. at 72 ("[A]ny 'crowd'-whether it be a market, a corporation, or an
intelligence agency-needs to find the right balance between ... two imperatives: making individual
knowledge globally and collectively useful .. ., while still allowing it to remain resolutely specific and
local.").
89. See id. at 76 ("It's hard to make real decentralization work, and hard to keep it
going....").
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"[g]overnment regulation of crowds stems from fundamental
understandings-and misunderstandings-of the nature of crowd activity.
Regulation reveals a tension between conflicting understandings of the
nature of crowds." 90 This insight also seems applicable to disclosure
regulation in the securities-crowdfunding context. Congress and the SEC
each have proposed mandatory disclosure to the crowd that will participate
in securities crowdfunding under the exemption provided in the
CROWDFUND Act.91 Yet, the SEC's knowledge or intuition about this
crowd remains unclear.
Does this securities-crowdfunding crowd have the attributes of a wise
crowd, or will it have a tendency to madness? If the crowd has the capacity
to be wise, then an issuer's disclosure to the crowd of information
important to decision making may be efficacious. The nature and extent of
any wisdom requires further explication in a later work and would benefit
from empirical study. If market decision making relies on information
cascades, direct-benefit effects, or price-to-price feedback, however, then
much of any mandated disclosure would have no impact on the decisions of
securities-crowdfunding investors. Each of these behavioral phenomena is
founded in the selective use of information to the exclusion of more allencompassing information-driven decision making. Mandatory disclosures
that do not contribute to the investors' decision-making rubric will be
ignored. Providing these additional disclosures therefore would be
inefficient, absent a change in investor behavior.
Crowdfunding proponents believe in the wisdom of the crowdfunding
crowd but acknowledge that observers fear the madness of the crowd.92 A
set of securities-crowdfunding advocates expressly (albeit simplistically)
advise tapping the crowd's wisdom by engaging in independent decision
making and information sharing.
[B]ecoming part of an investment crowd doesn't mean following
the actions of the crowd. Successful investing of any kind
requires that you make your own decisions. The wisdom of the
crowd can emerge only if each investor uses his or her best
judgment to decide whether an investment opportunity is a good
one. Sharing these thoughts in an open dialogue guides the crowd

90. Kaminski, supra note 21, at 4.
91. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-l(a)(3), 77d-I(b)(1) (2012) (requiring certain disclosures);
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227,
232, 239, 240, & 249) (summarizing the proposed rules on crowd funding).
92. See, e.g., LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 60-63 (discussing information cascades,
groupthink, herding, and Surowiecki's work in relation to crowdfunding).
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toward reasonable decisions. Pooling these thoughts together is
what creates crowd wisdom. 93
Along similar lines, two crowdfunding proponents specifically note,
consistent with Surowiecki's work (and at least in part in reliance on it),
that decision-making rules and structures can help avoid the crowd's
potential for madness.94 They list four "mitigating recommendations" from
Surowiecki's work (diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization,
and aggregation) and add a fifth (affinity groups).
Significant empirical research is needed to substantiate the nature of
the securities-crowdfunding crowd in the United States. However, the
description of that crowd in Part I, when mapped to the behavioral literature
in Part II, preliminarily indicates that the crowd of crowdfund investors has
the potential for wisdom. Its members, based on the anecdotal and sparse
empirical information available to date, are diverse and independent, and
their decision making is decentralized.
The members of the securities-crowdfunding crowd are likely to be
heterogeneous. Although conceptual and cognitive diversity are difficult to
assess, these crowd members should have the capacity to bring distinct,
new ideas and perspectives to the securities-crowdfunding decision-making
process. Assuming that diversity can be maintained over time from offering
to offering, groupthink should be avoidable. The existence of multiple
affinity groups within the securities-crowdfunding investor base is not
necessarily inconsistent with diversity.
Members of securities-crowdfunding's crowd also appear to be
independent. In individual offerings or within specific affinity groups,
hierarchical relationships among the crowd members or sequential decision
making may occur that could impair independent judgment or action.
However, in broad-based securities offerings conducted over the Internet, it
is unlikely that these relationships would exist or, if they did, that they
would result in a lack of independent behavior. Although the existence of
affinity groups in the securities-crowdfunding crowd may at first appear to
limit behavioral independence, in an effective decentralized structural
environment for decision making, "[t]hey are in part responsible for various
pieces of information getting traction by and exposure to the larger crowd

93.

NEISS ET AL., supra note 14, at 67.

94. See, e.g., LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 62-63 (discussing Surowiecki's assertion
that decision makers lose benefits of collective wisdom when proper decision-making environments are
absent).
95. Id.
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and also for maintaining the higher collective intelligence of the crowd (as
opposed to central command structures that tend to dumb people down)."9
To that point, the decision making of the securities-crowdfunding
crowd is likely to operate in a decentralized manner. As a general matter,
commentators have described crowdfunding's overall crowd as
"decentralized, self-determined community clusters woven into the tapestry
of the greater whole."9 This crowd makes its decisions based on the
aggregation of the specialized knowledge of the participants. The securitiescrowdfunding crowd may, in fact, include aggregators-in the form of the
legally mandated broker or funding portal or in the form of affinity
groups-that can ensure important information is effectively disseminated
across the crowd's membership. These aggregators are not experts that
others in the crowd follow, but rather nodes in the crowd's information
distribution network. Studies of the investor networks involved in securities
crowdfunding can be modeled on studies of networks relating to decision
making or prediction markets in other contexts.
If the securities-crowdfunding crowd does have the potential to be wise
and disclosure may therefore be effectual, then a number of questions
naturally follow. For example, what disclosures will enable intelligent
decision making? Do existing disclosure paradigms adequately serve this
crowd? Are the members of the securities-crowdfunding crowd "reasonable
investors" such that current disclosure regulation (and federal securities
regulation more generally) protects members of the crowd well? The
answers to these questions remain to be seen. Additional demographics,
some of which are emergent, should give us better information on the
nature of crowdfunding investors that will enable more targeted mandatory
disclosures.
In general, however, if we assume (as extant crowdfunding literature
would suggest) that individual investors in crowdfunded securities offerings
bring diverse and independent judgment to their decision making, it would
seem that the required disclosures for any crowdfunding offering should
address only the core issues necessary to an understanding of the business
or project, the terms of the outstanding, available, and offered investment
interests in the business or project, and the plan of distribution of the
securities in the offering. The members of the crowd will then add to the
information mix (by, for instance, asking questions to illicit additional
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id. at 5.
98. See, e.g., WATTS, supra note 23, at 7-8 (suggesting broad-bascd applications of smallworld research that could include crowd behavior in the sccuritics-crowdfunding context); see also
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 149-53 (discussing prediction and decision markets generally).
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information or expressing their opinions on the business, project,
investment interest, or offering). A possible result is a richer, but more
dynamic, disclosure environment in which investors, as well as issuers and
intermediaries, contribute more actively and systematically to the total mix
of available information." The key for regulators will be to balance the
potential chaos of this dynamism against the structure provided by
mandatory disclosure regulation. 0 0
CONCLUSION

Congress included mandatory disclosure as a component of the
CROWDFUND Act's securities-crowdfunding registration exemption
under the 1933 Act.o10 The decision to include mandatory disclosure in the
CROWDFUND Act's provisions appears to be an astute one. The crowd of
securities-crowdfunding investors likely has the capacity to use disclosed
information in its investment deliberations because its members are, by all
appearances, diverse and independent, and the crowd-based structure of
their decision making is decentralized. Theory predicts that these conditions
enable efficacious information transfers and the wisdom of the crowd.
As the SEC contemplates the adoption of its final rules to effectuate
Congress's desired mandatory disclosure regime under the CROWDFUJND
Act, however, it should be (and is) concerned that a large piece of the
securities-crowdfunding puzzle is missing. The exact nature of the primary
disclosure audience-the crowd that will engage in investing through
securities crowdfunding-may play a role in the need for certain types of
disclosures to adequately protect investors, maintain market integrity, and
encourage capital formation. Because the legalized market for unregisteredcrowdfunded securities offerings will only come into being after the
adoption of the related SEC rules, adjustments to the disclosure regime
reactive to the nature of the securities-crowdfunding crowd will have to be
introduced at a later date. The best the SEC can do is to speculate on the
nature of the securities-crowdfunding crowd based on available information
from general crowdfunding studies and relevant foreign studies of securities
crowdfunding.
Although this Article focuses on mandatory disclosure regulation in
securities crowdfunding, the capacity of the securities-crowdfunding crowd
99. This may include, for example, price discovery as an alternative to more traditional
valuations of start-ups and small businesses. See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 12, at 63-64.
100. See id. at 53-54 (describing crowdfunding's place at "the edge of chaos"-"a region near
the threshold between order and chaos").
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-l(a)(3), 77d-l(b)(1) (2012).
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for madness and wisdom also provides guidance in other, related areas
relevant to the policies underlying securities regulation in the United States.
In its rulemaking, the SEC also must consider and address, for example,
investor education in the crowdfunding context. This aspect of the
CROWDFUND Act offers the SEC the opportunity to reinforce the
attributes of the crowdfunding crowd that foster crowd intelligencediversity, independence, and decentralization. Having said that, the costbenefit analysis for investor education efforts is far from clear.' 0 2
At this juncture, the disclosure puzzle relating to securities
crowdfunding remains unsolved. However, there is a way forward.
Scholarly work in behavioral science recognizes that crowds of decision
makers can behave in ways that are beneficial or damaging.
Groups enthrall us with their ability to amplify the range of
individual achievements. On the one hand, groups provide us
with the opportunity to reach heights far greater than any
individual might accomplish. Yet, groups also entail considerable
risk for they also have the potential to produce unimaginable
destruction. Explaining why these outcomes occur has been a
daunting task for social and organizational researchers. 0 3
No doubt, continued work must be done to unearth more information about
why crowds act wisely or madly; this Article opens but a small window on
the existing literature that addresses crowd wisdom and madness.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that, when considering and designing
disclosure to and for the securities-crowdfunding crowd, the existing
behavioral literature should be taken into account. Once securities
crowdfunding under the CROWDFUND Act commences, researchers will
be able to study the actual securities-crowdfunding crowd in operation.
These studies should enable and may dictate, among other things, a more
refined calibration of mandatory disclosure rules targeted to the securitiescrowdfunding context.

102. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOwA L. REV.
197 (2008) (assessing and challenging the efficacy offinancial-literacy education).
103. Turner & Pratkanis, supra note 72, at 105.

